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COURTS-EVIDENCE &
PROCEDURE
COMMENTARY: THE SECOND CIRCUIT
AND THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
Paul F. Rothstein:
The most significant development in federal trial procedure in
recent years has been the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, effective July 1, 1975.1 In the intervening two years since
the Rules became effective, the courts of the Second Circuit have
bad occasion to make several illuminating applications of and refer-
ences to them.
An examination of some of these decisions provides insight
into the kinds of questions that are coming up not only in the
Second Circuit, but around the country, and the kinds of answers
that are being given. It is not the bizarre or unusual case that wvill
tell us whether and how the rules are working, but the mine-run of
cases; and this circuit provides a good sampling. The following dis-
cussion will also include a few decisions which, although not from
the Second Circuit, are sufficiently "next door" to be of interest to
the Second Circuit lawyer.
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, D.C.; Au-
thor, numerous books and articles on evidence and trials, including several on the
Federal Rules of Evidence and the student text, Evidence in a Nutshell (West Publ.
Co. 1970). Advisor to the United States Senate Judiciary Committee on several proj-
ects, including the Rules of Evidence and Rules of Criminal Procedure; Reporter,
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws; Chairman, Associa-
tion of American Law Schools, Evidence Section; Member, Continuing Legal Educa-
tion Board and National Council, Federal Bar Association; Member, D.C. and Il-
linois Bars and the Bars of several federal courts; Columnist, New York Law Journal.
' Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1929 (Jan. 2, 1975), amendcd by Pub. L No.
94-113, 89 Stat. 576 (Oct. 16, 1975) (re-instating stricken Rule 801(d)(l)(C), relating to
statements of identification as exempt from the hearsay rule) and Pub. L No. 94-149.
89 Stat. 805 (Dec. 12, 1975) (making spelling and grammar corrections and rewriting
Rule 410, relating to the admissibility of certain pleas and accompanying statements).
For an excellent recent symposium on the Rules, see 9 U. CALIF. DAvIS L REv.
xx.xVii (1976). See also P. ROTHSTEIN, FEDERAL RULES OF EvIDENCE (Clark Board-
man Co., looseleaf service, updated through 1977); P. ROTHSTEIN. UNDERSTANDING
THE NEW FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE (N.Y.L.J. Press 1973) (biennial supple-
ments).
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ARTICLE II: JUDICIAL NOTICE
Article II of the Rules establishes a test of virtual indisputabil-
ity before "adjudicative facts" (facts of the type customarily found
by the trier-of-fact) will be judicially noticed, leaving other types
of fact (e.g., legislative or policy-type facts) unregulated. 2 That the
distinction between "adjudicative" and other facts would be murky
and difficult to administer had been predicted, although some such
distinction was nonetheless recognized as essential. 3
After remarking on the difficulty of drawing the distinction,
the trial judge in Goodman v. Stalfort,4 held that the act of add-
ing charcoal lighter fluid to lighted coals, resulting in burns, was
contributory negligence as a matter of law. He arrived at this by
taking judicial notice of the nature and development of charcoal
lighter fluid, the grey appearance of ignited charcoal, and the igni-
tion caused by adding lighter fluid. These facts were considered
common knowledge under Rule 201. The same judge, in an-
other decision, 5 took notice of matters not of general common
awareness, but commonly known in the district-also licensed by
the rule-i.e., knowledge that, in 1974, many taxpayers received
notices that the refunds to which they were entitled were being
applied to amounts erroneously stated as still due for 1971. Thus, a
taxpayer's claim for a refund, unsupported by further information,
was held to state a claim, and discovery was ordered on his behalf.
ARTICLE IV: RELEVANCY AND ITS LIMITS
This Article of the Rules defines relevancy broadly;' it also
grants the judge. a wide power to balance relevance against prej-
udice, time consumption, and confusion; 7 codifies particular appli-
2 See generally Lenox, The Use of Non-Legal Data in the Decision-Making
Process, 1 GLENDALE L. REV. 177 (1976); Comment, Judicial Notice: Rule 201 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, 28 U. FLA. L. REV. 723 (1976). For discussions of Rule
201, see United States v. Salzmann, 417 F. Supp. 1139 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (judlicil
notice taken that Israel has extradited certain persons upon request by the United
States, although not required by treaty to do so); Antco Shipping Co. v. Sidermar,
417 F. Supp. 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (201(b)-doubt concerning purpose of contract
clause prevents judicial notice of purpose).
3 P. ROTHSTEIN, THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, supra note 1, at 34. Roths-
tein, The Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 62 CEO. L.J. 125,
161 passim (1973).
1411 F. Supp. 889 (D.N.J. 1976).
- Neal v. United States, 402 F. Supp. 678 (D.N.J. 1975).6 See FED. R. EvID. 401.
'See id. 403. See also United States v. Araujo, 539 F.2d 287 (2d Cir. 1976);
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cations of such balancing;8 and provides for related policy matters.9
The conceptual breadth of relevancy, and the fact that the coun-
tervailing considerations of time and prejudice will not lightly
overcome relevance (under Rule 403, they must be "undue" and
must "substantially outweigh" probativity), combined wvith the trial
judge's broad discretion in these matters, are illustrated in a gov-
ernment officiars recent bribe solicitation trial. In United States r.
Iaconetti,10 Judge Weinstein held that evidence of the solicitee's
prompt consultation with a business partner and lawyer after the
meeting wvith the government official gave rise to an inference that
something related to the business had occurred at the meeting, and
also held that repetition of some allied matter to rebut defendant's
version of the meeting did not run afoul of the balancing provi-
sions.
Another group of cases focused on character evidence. Rule
404 generally prohibits the use of other crimes and wrongs to help
establish the charged crime, but makes certain exceptions in sub-
section (b) for proving motive, intent, knowledge, and other similar
purposes, subject, of course, to the balancing process."1 Three re-
cent rulings have shed some light on how this operates. In United
States v. Johnson,'2 the Second Circuit stated that, under the
catchword of "motive," Rule 404 would allow the shoing, in a
robbery case, of the use of robbery proceeds for payment in a nar-
cotics operation. In United States v. Flores,13 owing to a legal
technicality relating to extradition treaties, the defendant, although
indicted for conspiracy, could be charged with no conspiratorial
acts occurring prior to a certain date, but only with those following
that date; nevertheless, evidence of the earlier actions was ad-
missible to prove "knowledge or intent." And in United States v.
Jackson,14 although evidence of defendant's flight from custody,
United States v. Dwyer, 539 F.2d 924 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Robinson, 544
F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1976).8See FED. R. EVID. 404-406 (character, habit, practice); id. 407-410 (remedial
measures, compromises, payments, pleas); id. 411 (insurance).
9 See id. 407-410 (remedial measures, compromises, payments, pleas). Insofar as
they are not related to relevance, probativity, prejudice, and time, the privilege as-
pects of these rules speaks to encouraging desirable conduct and fostering particular
policies.
10 406 F. Supp. 554 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd 540 F.2d 574 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
97 S. Ct. 739 (1977).
11 See FED. R. EVID. 403; text accompanying note 7 supra.
12 525 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 920 (1976).
13 411 F. Supp. 38 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
14 405 F. Supp. 938 (E.D.N.Y. 1975). Other Second Circuit cases on Rule 404
19771
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subsequent evasion of police, and use of false identification, was
considered probative of the crime charged when found to be em-
braced by several Rule 404(b) catchwords, the decision illustrates
effectively that the inquiry does not stop there-the balancing of
Rule 403 must also be considered. On the one hand, infirmities in
the Government's identification created a premium on this evi-
dence; on the other hand, though probative, it was only weakly so,
because the defendant might have been evading arrest owing to
another crime for which he had been recently indicted. And prej-
udice would accrue from the unsavory circumstances surrounding
the evasion-guns in the car, for example. Furthermore, if' the
flight evidence were introduced, the inquiry could not fairly be cut
short without opening up the subject of the other indictment,
which might have accounted for the flight. Judge Weinstein's in-
novative solution was an attempt to obtain the legitimate value of
the evidence without the bad side effects, by ruling that the evi-
dence would be inadmissible at trial if the defendant would stipu-
late that he had used a false name after the robbery.
Rule 407, generally banning evidence of subsequent remedial
measures as indicative of fault, is not confined to personal injury
cases, as is frequently assumed. This is illustrated by SEC v. Geon
Industries, Inc., 15 where evidence of defendant brokerage firm's
subsequent change of rules to prevent its registered securities rep-
resentatives from engaging in certain suspect trading practices, was
not allowed to be taken as tending to prove prior negligent super-
vision of its offending employee. And in Smyth v. Upjohn Co., 1
the court properly disallowed the use of evidence that defendant
drug company had put stronger warnings on its drug product fol-
lowing plaintiff's adverse reaction to the drug. This constituted a
subsequent remedial measure and was held to be outside the
Rule's exception for showing feasibility, since the ability of the
company to issue a stronger warning was not controverted. While
Rule 407 permits subsequent remedial measures to be used fbr
purposes other than implied admissions of culpable conduct or neg-
ligence-such as ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary
measures-the Rule requires that such other issues be "contro-
verted." Although certain other similarly structured Article IV
are United States v. Payden, 536 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1976), and United States v. \'r-
net, 539 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1976).
15 531 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1976).
16 529 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1975).
[Vol. ,11 1097
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rules do not expressly incorporate the same requirement,' 7 it would
be %vise to interpret them in a fashion requiring at least a genuine
issue.
ARTICLE V: PRIVILEGES
Instead of providing specific rules of evidentiary privilege,
Rule 501 provides for the application of the "principles of the
common law" of privileges "interpreted in the light of reason and
experience," except in certain state-law cases, where state privilege
law applies. Matters such as bans on evidence of remedial mea-
sures, offers of compromise, evidence of insurance, and character
evidence, being in Article IV, are not regarded as privileges. Art-
icle V covers such questions as the existence and scope of marital
and medical privileges, privileges related to attorneys, accountants,
journalists, and informants, and privileges covering governmental
secrets.
In one recent case, 18 an anonymous cashier's check was sent
to the IRS to cover overdue tax payments. The IRS sought from
the lawyer both the identity of his client on whose behalf the check
was sent, and the bank's records relating to the issuance of the
check, to identify the purchaser. The court overruled a claim of
attorney-client privilege on both items, holding that a federal tax
matter was among those areas governed by the "common law . . .
reason and experience" standard in Rule 501, and concluding that,
under this standard, neither item was privileged: The bank records
were not confidential communications by the client to the attorney;
and a client's identity is not covered by the privilege. 19
'7 See FED. R. EvID. 408 (compromise); 411 (insurance).
18 Gannet v. First Nat'l State Bank, 410 F. Supp. 585 (D.N.J., ret d on otier
grounds sub nom. United States v. First Nat'l State Bank, 540 F.2d 619 (3d Cir.), and
affd in part sub nom. Gannet v. First Nat'l State Bank, 546 F.2d 1072 (3d Cir.
1976).
19 For a similar recent ruling within the Second Circuit, see United States s.
Mackey, 405 F. Supp. 854 (E.D.N.Y. 1975), holding that the identity of a taxpa. er,
the general nature of the legal services rendered, and publicly available infornation
about ownership interests were unprivileged, and reserving, on other allegedly
privileged matters, the question whether the evidence comes within the exception
to the privilege for matters in "furtherance of crime or fraud." There are contrary
rulings on the identity question. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 517 F.2d 666 (5th
Cir. 1975) (citing Rule 501); Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960) (decided
prior to the effective date of Rule 501). For a recent case agreeing that the nature of
the services rendered must be disclosed, see United States v. Osborn, 409 F. Supp.
406 (D. Ore. 1975).
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In a case involving criminal grand jury proceedings,20 the
qualified privilege for an attorney's work-product, covering materi-
als prepared in anticipation of litigation, was imported into the
"common law . .. reason and experience" standard, in the same
form as has been codified for discovery in civil cases by Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3), although no such privilege was recog-
nized at common law. Relying on a recent Supreme Court ruling
recognizing the privilege as a matter of judge-made law in the trial
of a criminal case, 2' this district court resolved, for itself at least, the
conflict 22 over the question whether Rule 501 uses the term "com-
mon law" strictly to refer to a period of history, thus precluding
new privileges, or in the looser sense of a common law process
permitting recognition of new privileges based on general policies
found in the common law (or at least new privileges that have con-
siderable authority in modern cases, statutes, or rules23). The case
20 In re Grand Jury Investigation (Sturgis), 412 F. Supp. 943 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
21 United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975).
22 412 F. Supp. at 947 n.3. The following cases involve privileges or exceptions
thereto, unknown at common law, tinder the federal common law branch of' Rule
501: United States v. Allery, 526 F.2d 1362 (8th Cir. 1975) (extending the common
law exception to marital privilege for crimes against a spouse to cover crimes against
a child of a spouse); United States v. Meagher, 531 F.2d 752 (5th Cir. 1976) (refusing
to recognize a federal physician-patient privilege); In re Grand Jury Impanelled Jan.
21, 1975 (Freedman, Cortese), 541 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1976) (refusing to recognize a
prothonotary privilege); United States v. Cortese, 540 F.2d 640 (3d Cir. 1976) (same);
United States v. Craig, 528 F.2d 773 (7th Cir. 1976) (recognizing a state-legislator
privilege but holding it waived on the facts), rehearing en bane, 537 F.2d 957 (7th
Cir. 1976) (refusing to recognize such a privilege). For cases within the Second Cir-
cuit, see United States v. King, No. 76-CR-482 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 1976) (recognizing
a qualified privilege for state income tax returns); Edney v. Smith, 425 F. Stpp,
1038 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (recognizing a qualified psychotherapist privilege). Cf. Rich-
ards of Rockford, Inc. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 71 F.R.D. 388 (N.D. Cal. 1976)
(creating a new privilege-a researcher's privilege-in discovery stage of case Involv-
ing the state-law branch of Rule 501, where state law would not recognize; Invokes
inherent power of court over discovery to do so; but see Rule 1101, which makes Rule
501, and, thus, state privilege law, binding in this type of case; or does It?). Several of
these cases suggest that the earlier draft of the Rules, approved by the Supreme Court
but altered by Congress to delete the codification of particular privileges, may help In
fashioning a modern "common law" under Rule 501. Others disagree.
1 It is on this latter basis that a claim of physician-patient privilege, for example,
can be distinguished from a claim of parent-child or researcher-source privilege. Al-
though policies of confidentiality and encouragement of communication, information,
and professional or personal relationships can be found in the common law to sup-
port all of these claims, modern statutes and decisions among the states tend to sup-
port the physician-patient privilege, but not the other two.
It should be remembered that Rule 501 refers not to the "common law," but to
"'principles of the common law" as "interpreted in the light of [modern] reason and
experience." This would seem to license at least some new privileges, not previously
[Vol. 43: 1097
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also made it clear, as does Rule 1101, that Rule 501 applies to grand
jury investigations.
Another very significant decision in the area of privilege,
Kaufman v. Edelstein,24 involved an expert's privilege to resist
process to compel him to perform as a witness. Its thorough ex-
amination in the material immediately following this Commentary,
however, will not be repeated here.
ARTICLE VI: WITNESSES
Article VI of the Rules treats the issue of witnesses' compe-
tency in much the same fashion as Article V handles privileges, ex-
cept that, instead of a "common law . .. reason and experience"
standard for federal-issue litigation, a very narrow, exclusive list of
incompetencies is provided. Article VI also regulates certain other
matters concerning presentation of witnesses, particularly impeach-
ment and cross examination.
Rule 608(b) allows specific instances of conduct to be brought
out-on cross-examination only-to impeach a witness if strongly
probative of incredibility. This is illustrated by Lewis v. Baker,2 in
which the Second Circuit permitted a falsified employment appli-
cation to be introduced on the issue of credibility during cross-
examination.
Three cases involving impeachment of the criminal defendant
as a witness illustrate the operation of Rule 609, which allows cer-
tain convictions to be brought out for impeachment. The Rule
allows evidence of felonies that are not crimes of "dishonesty or
false "statemenf ' only upon an assessment that probativity out-
_veighs prejudice to the defendant. 26 The burden is on the Govern-
ment,2 7 and it is noteworthy that the requirement for exclusion is
recognized, in cases where they share common policies with existing privileges. See
generally P. ROTHSTEIN, UNDERSTANDING THE NEW FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
197 passim (N.Y.L.J. Press, Supp. 1975).
- 539 F.2d 811 (2d Cir. 1976).
- 526 F.2d 470 (2d Cir. 1975).
2 It is now fairly well agreed that larceny, robbery, assault, and narcotics viola-
tions, as distinct from embezzlement, perjury, and fraud, are not nonnally crimes of
"dishonesty or false statement" (although Congress purposely left the matter some-
what vague due to an inability to agree on specific crimes that could be used). See
Virgin Islands v. Toto, 529 F.2d 278 (3d Cir. 1976); Virgin Islands v. Testamark, 528
F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1976). See also United States v. Smith, No. 7.5-1920 (D.C. Cir. Dec.
17, 1976); United States v. Millings, 535 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1976). But see United
States v. Carden, 529 F.2d 443 (5th Cir. 1976) (petit larceny involves "'dishonesty").
2 7 See Statement of Rep. William L. Hungate, Conferee on the Rules enactment,
1977]
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not that probative value must be "substantially outweighed," as it
is under Rule 403 (the "balancing" rule mentioned earlier). A slight
imbalance is enough under Rule 609. Presumably, use of Rule 403
is preempted under 609.
In United States v. Brown ,28 the court, examining Rule 609,
held that a seven-year-old felony narcotics conviction (not involving
dishonesty or false statement) could not be used to impeach a defen-
dant charged with narcotics violations because of the similarity of
the crimes. In United States v. Jackson,29 the court excluded a
more recent felony assault conviction (not involving dishonesty or
false statement) in a robbery case, largely because of the at-
tenuated relationship between assault and credibility. Despite the
fact that both judges in these two cases ordered exclusion, they
sharply disagreed on the criteria governing the "balancing" assess-
ment. The judge in Brown believed that similarity of the crimes
was the principal consideration, and apparently paid less attention
to the nature of the crime as it relates to credibility. He disagreed
with expressions in many cases that the length of time between the
impeaching crime and the trial is critical, believing instead that re-
moteness reduces not only probativity, but also prejudice. He also
rejected the Jackson court's suggestions that necessity for encourag-
ing defendant to testify can be a key factor and that a strong Gov-
ernment case makes impeachment of the defendant less important
and the impeaching evidence less necessary. He believed, instead,
that strength in the remainder of the Government's case makes
prejudice from impeachment evidence less likely because the jury
is less inclined to be irrationally swayed by it in relation to the
other evidence in the case.
The Jackson court mentioned two contingencies which would
change its ruling of exclusion: (1) if the defendant were to suggest
that he had not been in trouble with the law, or (2) if he were to
introduce assault convictions of government witnesses without prior
court permission. The first seems directly related to the probativity-
prejudice assessment; the second seems less so, and requires some
innovation under the rules.
and Chairman, House Judiciary Subcommittee on Criminal Justice. 120 CONG. IEWC.
H. 12253 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1971); Statement of Cong. Dennis in the debate 1llnw-
ing, id.at 12255 et seq. See also United States v. Smith, No. 75-1920 (D.C. CIr. Dec.
17, 1976), and United States v. Mahone, 537 F.2d 922, 929 (7th Cir. 1976), stiuget-
ing that the best practice is for judges to make express findings on this issue, with an
on-the-record hearing.
28 409 F. Stpp. 890 (W.D.N.Y. 1976).
29 405 F. Supp. 938 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
[Vol. 43: 1097
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In United States c. Canniff,30 the Second Circuit cited Rule
609(d) for the proposition that a narcotics defendant who has taken
the stand normally may not be asked on cross-examination about
prior juvenile adjudications for impeachment purposes. But the
court found that such inquiries did not require reversal in this case
because (1) the defendant had claimed in his direct testimony to
have had a clean record; (2) the prosecution's cross-examination
question to the defendant had been based on some information;
and (3) the defendant had answered the question in the negative.
ARTICLE VIII: HEARSAY
Rule 801(d)(1)(A) changes the traditional rule that prior incon-
sistent statements of a witness who testifies at trial are admissible
only for impeachment purposes, but not as substantive evidence
unless the statement is within an independent hearsay exemption
or exception. 31 Under the new Rule, such statements are charac-
terized as not hearsay at all, and thus are admissible as substantive
evidence, without the necessity of finding an independent excep-
tion or exemption, provided that certain enumerated required con-
ditions are met and that neither other rules nor tie Constitution
are transgressed. The required conditions are that the witness
presently be on the stand subject to examination concerning his
prior inconsistent statement, and that such statement have been
given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hear-
ing, disposition, or other proceeding, whether in the same case
or not, and regardless of whether there was any opportunity to
cross-examine. The precise meaning of "proceeding" is uncertain.
It is clear that grand jury investigations are encompassed. But what
about other agency investigations under oath? What about a state-
ment before a notary? Also somewhat uncertain is exactly what is
meant by "inconsistent." How inconsistent must the statement be?
Will lack of memory of facts once remembered be inconsistent? The
Second Circuit has not addressed these matters, but has shed some
light on other aspects of the Rule.
In United States v. Blitz, 32 a complex securities fraud case,
30 521 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1059 (1976).
31 But see Letendre v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 21 N.Y.2d 518, 289 N.Y.S.2d
183, 2.36 N.E.2d 467 (1968), and Vincent v. Thompson, 50 App. Di%. 2d 211, 377
N.Y.S.2d 118 (2d Dep't 1975), which present de possibilih that, in New York, prior
inconsistent statements may properly be admissible for their truth by constitutIlnz a
new exception to or exemption from tie hearsay rle in civil c.ises.
32533 F.2d 1329 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 65 (1976).
1977]
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one co-conspirator contested the admission into evidence of the in-
criminating grand jury testimony of another co-conspirator, -whose
testimony at the present trial was inconsistent with his gand jury
testimony. All the conditions for admissibility under Rule
801(d)(1)(A) were met: The declarant (1) testified at the present
trial and thus was subject to examination concerning the prior
statement, which was (2) inconsistent with his testimony, and (3)
given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at another pro-
ceeding. The Second Circuit held the statement admissible, relying
in part on the new rule (technically not yet binding at the trial) and
on its earlier decision in United States v. De Sisto,33 which had
formed the basis for a special Second Circuit exception to the hear-
say rule, developed before the adoption of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, for statements made at a former trial or grand jury pro-
ceeding in the same case. This "De Sisto exception" has now been
engulfed and rendered largely unnecessary by the new rule.
In a decision handed down just prior to Blitz, the Second
Circuit had acknowledged the existence of a "current of modern
opinion" in favor of Rule 801(d)(1)(A). United States v. Jordano34
involved a conviction for robbery of a bank messenger. The deflen-
dant's girlfriend had given grand jury testimony implicating the
defendant in the crime charged. When the Government called
her as its witness at trial, however, she denied the facts related
before the grand jury and the truth of that testimony, claiming
coercion by the authorities. The Government then offered the wit-
ness' grand jury testimony, which was held admissible as substan-
tive evidence of the crime charged, the court citing both Rule
801(d)(1)(A) and De Sisto. The court thus felt that it was not bound
to adhere rigidly to the traditional requirement that one may not
impeach one's own witness unless the testimony comes as a stir-
prise,35 since this was affirmative evidence rather than impeach-
ment.
Rule 801(d)(1)(B) exempts witnesses' prior consistent state-
ments from the hearsay rule under certain conditions, riz., to
rebut an express or implied charge of recent flbrication or improp-
a3 329 F.2d 929 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 979 (196-1).
34 521 F.2d 695 (2d Cir. 1975).
35 Defendants charged that the requisite surprise was lacking since the witnes
had recanted her grand jury testimony at a prior trial. Id. at 697.
[Vol. 43: 1097
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er influence or motive. Traditionally, prior consistent statements
were admissible only on the issue of credibility (a non-hearsay
usage), not for their truth (a hearsay use). Even then, the afore-
mentioned conditions (arising out of considerations of economy)
had to be complied with. Under the new Rule, such statements are
characterized as non-hearsay and are thus admissible as substantive
evidence, i.e., for their truth, as well as on the issue of credibility.
In United States v. Iaconetti,36 a federal government contract
inspector was convicted of soliciting and accepting a bribe from two
government suppliers. The Government's chief witness was one
Lioi, an officer in a corporation seeking a government contract.
Lioi testified that the defendant, upon conducting a pre-award sur-
vey, bad solicited a bribe in exchange for his approval in awarding
the contract to Lioi's firm. Upon taking the %vitness stand, the de-
fendant not only denied having requested a bribe, but charged that
it was in fact Lioi who had offered him an unsolicited bribe. In
rebuttal, the Government presented as witnesses Lioi's business
partner and the firm's attorney, who testified that, on the day of
the alleged bribe, Lioi had related to them the defendant's request
for payment. It was this testimony to which the defendant ob-
jected, grounding his arguments on the hearsay rule. The lower
court held that this evidence was nevertheless admissible, rely-
ing alternatively on three Rules, the first of which was Rule
801(d)(1)(B). As described by the district court, this Rule would
appear to be clearly applicable: the declarant, Lioi, testified at trial
and was subject to cross-examination; the statement testified to by
the two witnesses was consistent vith Lioi's testimony; and it was
offered to rebut an implied charge of improper motive-defen-
dant's allegation that it was Lioi who had attempted to bribe him.
However, on appeal, the Second Circuit declined to consider
whether the testimony would be admissible under this Rule, pre-
ferring to rest its conclusion of admissibility on the other Rules
cited by the lower court, which embodied other exemptions from
or exceptions to the hearsay rule. 37 The decision thus suggests, as
have earlier Second Circuit decisions, 38 that the court may feel
3r6 406 F. Supp. 554 (E.D.N.Y.), affd, 540 F.2d 574 (2d Cir. 1976). cert. denied,
97 S. Ct. 739 (1977).37 See text accompanying notes 41-42, 53-59 infra.
38See, e.g., United States v. Blitz, 533 F.2d 1329 (2d Cir.). cert. denied. 97 S. Ct.
65 (1976); United States v. Briggs, 457 F.2d 908, 910 n.3. (2d Cir. 1972). Most of the
criticism of the new Rule came from judge Friendly, who also opposed the Rule in
19771
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that Rule 801(d)(1) goes too far in a criminal case when used
against the defendant, and should not be employed where not ab-
solutely mandatory.
Turning to another of the Article VIII provisions, Rule
801(d)(2)(B) comports with the traditional rule that a statement
not made by a party is nonetheless considered an admission by him,
and is offerable against him for its truth, when he has manifested his
adoption of or belief in its truth. One example is an admission by
silence, that is, concurrence in a statement by remaining silent
when the party would be expected to deny it. The only modification
that the new Rule made is its labelling this kind of statement as not
hearsay at all, while traditionally such a statement would be con-
sidered an exception to the hearsay rule-a distinction of no real
significance.
United States c. Flecha39 demonstrates how the courts will
look to common law principles in determining whether the evi-
dence falls within Rule 801(d)(2)(B). There, five defendants were
told to stand next to one another in line, after having been arrested
on drug-related charges but before Miranda warnings were given
them. One defendant then said to Flecha in Spanish, "Why so
much excitement? If we are caught, we are caught." The trial
judge allowed this statement in evidence against Flecha. Although
the Second Circuit ultimately found this to be harmless error in
light of all the other incriminating evidence, it engaged in a de-
tailed analysis of the common law principle of admission by silence
to show why the trial judge's admission of this evidence constituted
error. This was done "to prevent future reliance on the 'working
rule' so rightly condemned by Wigmore and other eminent jurists
... ,-40 From the maxim "silence gives consent," there apparently
developed the disreputable "working rule" that anything said in a
party's presence was receivable against him as an admission. The
Flecha panel stressed that the qualifications to this principle must
not be overlooked: There is no such admission unless the circum-
stances indicate that a non-acquiescing person in the party's position
would have responded to the statement with a denial. The court
found that the present case typified the situation where a response
Congress and is responsible, in some measure, for its passage in a narrower form
than originally proposed. See Rothstein, The Proposed Amendments, supra note .3,
at 147.
a9 539 F.2d 874 (2d Cir. 1976).40 Id. at 878.
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could not be expected from the party. Although Flecha was not
being questioned by the authorities and had not been given
Miranda warnings at the time of the statement, he clearly may
have been aware of the advisability of silence under the circum-
stances of his arrest, regardless of his belief in the truth or falsity of
the incriminating implications of the statement. The Second Circuit
panel also pointed out that it was natural for Flecha to have made
no response, considering the substance of the statement directed at
him-it was, after all, undeniably true that he had been "caught."
Rule 801(d)(2)(C) similarly classifies as non-hearsay party-ad-
missions, statements that are made by a person who is authorized by
the party to make the statement. The trial court in United States
v. Iaconetti41 held that the testimony of the Government's two
rebuttal witnesses was admissible both under this provision and
Rule 801(d)(1)(B), as related above. When the defendant requested
the bribe from Lioi to facilitate his firm's obtaining the contract,
defendant thereby impliedly authorized Lioi to confer with his
business associates. This followed because the defendant was fa-
miliar with the organization of Lioi's business and the necessity of
discussion with the others to procure the requested payments.
Under this reasoning, when Lioi reported the defendant's request
to the two witnesses, he was making a statement authorized by the
defendant, which would therefore be receivable against the defen-
dant as an admission. The Second Circuit agreed with this reason-
ing, but only insofar as it related to Lioi's statements to his busi-
ness partner (who would necessarily be consulted on such business
decisions), not as it related to Lioi's statements to the firm's attor-
ney, with whom the defendant would not reasonably have expected
Lioi to consult.42
41 406 F. Supp. 554 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), discussed in text accompanying notes
36-37 supra.
4 To complete the picture of vicarious party admissions, the reader should also
be aware of Rules 801(d)(2)(D) (agent's statements relating to agent's job) and (EI
(co-conspirator statements). On the latter provision, see United State% v. Lain Lek
Chong, 544 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1976) ("preponderance of evidence" required to show
defendant's connection with conspiracy; arrest terminates conspiracy). Compart
United States v. Beasley, No. 75-4373 (5th Cir. Jan. 7, 1977) (requires only "prima
facie case" of conspiracy and "slight evidence" of defendant's connection); United
States v. Hassell, No. 76-1272 (8th Cir. Jan. 10, 1977) ("slight evidence" of dclarant's
connection with conspiracy). See also FED. R. EVID. 104, which governs determi-
nations of this nature, and, on the relationship between the two Rules, United States
v. Petrozziello, No. 76-1111 (1st Cir. Jan. 21, 1977), and United States v. Herrera. .107
F. Supp. 766 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
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Rule 803, the first of two Rules outlining the specific excep-
tions to the hearsay rule, is concerned with situations where the
availability of the declarant is immaterial to the admissibility of the
evidence, while Rule 804 provides for exceptions that exist only
when the declarant is unavailable. Rule 803(6), the federal codifica-
tion of the book entries rule, resembles the Federal Business Re-
cords Act, 43 which the new Rule supersedes. Thus, recent cases
decided during the transition period which construe the require-
ments of the Business Records Act may be instructive in providing
an insight into future application and construction of Rule 803(6).
One such case is United States v. Pent-R-Books, Inc., 44 involv-
ing the federal statute regulating the mailing of pandering ad-
vertisements-the "Pandering Law." 45 Under this law, once an
addressee has received such matter through the mail, 40 he may re-
quest that the Postal Service issue an order to the sender prohibit-
ing further mailings to him beyond a certain date. Upon violation
of the prohibitory order, the Postal Service can demand that the
Attorney General seek a compliance order from the district court
against the mailer. In Pent-R-Books, twenty violated orders
charged against the defendant had reached the district court. The
parties submitted the administrative record, essentially showing
the preceding steps, to the district court, and made cross-motions
for summary judgment. The defendant, however, challenged the
admissibility of certain evidence contained in the administrative re-
cord as hearsay. This evidence consisted of notations made by the
complaining addressees, forwarded by them to the Postal Service,
indicating the receipt of mailings and their dates following the pro-
hibitory order. The defendant contended that these notations did
not fall within the Business Records Act's requirements for admis-
sibility, since the fact of receipt of the mailings and their dates
were entries made not by Postal Service employees but by third
parties-the addressees. No business employee of the Postal Ser-
vice had personal knowledge of those facts.
43 28 U.S.C. § 1732(a) (1970), repealed by enactment of the Federal Ru les of'
Evidence, Pub. L. No. 93-595, supra note 1, at § 2(b).
44538 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 1175 (1977). See also
Fernandez v. Chios Shipping Co., 542 F.2d 145, 154 (2d Cir. 1976) (utilizing the Rule
as well as Rule 702 (experts) in dealing with competency of a surveyor's report and a
marine carpenter to testify fo the cause of an accident).
45 39 U.S.C. § 3008 (1970).
46 Pandering materials are mailed advertisements which the addressee believes
to be "erotically arousing or sexually provocative." 538 F.2d at 521.
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Although the Second Circuit found this contention not un-
meritorious, it found more persuasive the liberal construction given
the statute by the Ninth Circuit in United States r. Lange.4 7 Un-
der both courts' reasoning, more emphasis was placed on the re-
liability of the records than on an adherence to the technical re-
quirements of the rule. The Pent-R-Books court thus found that,
since the notations bad been forwarded to the Postal Service on
the sole initiative of complaining citizens who desired action to be
taken for their benefit, "[tihe manner by which these records came
into the administrative files is an inherently reliable standard op-
erating procedure." 48 Thus, the letters were held to be admissible
as business records kept by the Postal Service.
There have been contrary decisions under the Business Rec-
ords Act, 49 and the Pent-R-Books construction would seem more
difficult, though not impossible, to sustain under Rule 803(6),
which is worded somewhat more explicitly. An earlier draft of Rule
803(6) would have precluded this construction, although the change
to the present draft does not appear to have been made for this
reason. 50 The guarantees of reliability peculiar to the business
context do not pertain to the addressees. Thus, it would seem
that, unless another exception to the hearsay rule could be found,
guaranteeing to some extent the reliability of the statements of
these addressee-declarants, the evidence, under the Rule, should
not be admitted. 5' A possible candidate for such an exception might
be Rule 803(24) or 804(b)(5), which allow for the creation of new
exceptions where trustworthiness is reasonably assured (as may be
here), need is found, and notice is gicen.5 2
47 466 F.2d 1021, 1024-25 (9th Cir. 1972).
48 538 F.2d at 529.
4 9 See, e.g., United States v. Thompkins, 487 F.2d 146 (8th Cir. 19731; United
States v. Burress, 412 F.2d 677 (4th Cir. 1969).
50 See generally P. ROTHSTEIN, UNDERSTANDINC THE NEW FEDEIUL RULES OF
EVIDENCE, supra note 23, at 414-17.
5 1 See, e.g., United States v. Bohle, 445 F.2d 54 (7th Cir. 1971). United States s.
Maddox, 444 F.2d 148 (2d Cir. 1971).
52The problem of the admissibility of Postal Service records and the specific
problem that the addressees were not functioning as part of the Postal Service are
issues that can arise not only under Rule 803(6) (business records), but also under
Rule 803(8) (official records); these two exceptions apparently overlap in some situa-
tions. Query, what happens if they conflict? On Rule 803(8), subdivision (C) (agency
factual findings as an exception to the hearsay rule), scec United States v. Corr, 54t3
F.2d 1042, 1051 (2d Cir. 1976) (SEC release offered by defendant not allowed; "not a
determination of facts after administrative proceedings," but only an informal pro-
nouncement during on-going proceedings). On Rule 803(10) (absence of official
record as proof of absence of fact, as an exception to the hearsay rule), see United
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Rule 803(24), like Rule 804(b)(5), provides an "open-ended ex-
ception for reliable and necessary hearsay [requiring] careful exer-
cise of judicial discretion."53 The primary condition for this broad
authorization to admit hearsay is that the statement must have cir-
cumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent to those of the
specific hearsay exceptions listed by the Federal Rules. Once this
criterion is satisfied, the court must additionally find that three
other requirements are met: the hearsay must be "material"; rea-
sonably needed because other evidence on the point is difficult to
get; and not contrary to both the "interests of justice" and the
"purposes of the Rules." Finally, admissibility of the evidence is
conditioned upon notice being provided to the adverse party of the
proponent's intention to offer the statement, including particulars,
sufficiently in advance of trial to allow for preparation by the ad-
verse party.
United States v. Iaconetti5 4 presents an interesting and in-
structive example of the application of this discretionary and
broadly termed exception. The district court held, and the Second
Circuit agreed, that the testimony of both of the Government's re-
buttal witnesses (set forth above)55 would be admissible under this
Rule. The primary criterion-that of trustworthiness-was met
since the declarant was available for cross-examination and the
statement was made soon after the alleged bribe had occurred and
to the appropriate persons. These facts, said the district court,
"would seem to mitigate the risks of insincerity and faulty
memory." 56 The court interpreted the requirement that the state-
ment be offered to prove a material fact as requiring more than
simply meeting Article IV's requirement of relevancy. It also pro-
hibits use of the evidence "for trivial or collateral matters."5 7 The
requirement of need, i.e., that the statement be more probative on
the point than any other reasonably obtainable evidence, was also
met, since the testimony of these rebuttal witnesses was found to
be the best evidence to corroborate the account of Lioi, the
States v. Robinson, 544 F.2d 110, 114-15 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. - (1976)
(nondiligent record search; inadmissible). See also United States v. Grady, 544 F.2d
598 (2d Cir. 1976) (Rule 803(8)(B)'s exclusion of matters observed by police officers
in criminal cases not applicable to police's "routine lists" of gun serial numbers since
not observations of criminal activities).
53 United States v. laconetti, 406 F. Supp. 554, 558 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
54 Id.
55 See text accompanying notes 36-37 supra.
56 406 F. Supp. at 559.
57 Id.
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prosecution's chief witness, as solicitee in the alleged conversation
with the defendant. Finally, the broad requirement that the "in-
terests of justice" and the "general purposes of the Rule" be served
by introduction of the evidence was summarily held to be met, for
the jury was entitled to all clarifying evidence in a case of this
nature, posing clear conflicts of credibility. On the question of
notice, both Iaconetti courts agreed that, although notice had not
been given in advance of the trial, and the proponent thereby
failed to comply strictly with the Rule, the opponent (defendant)
nevertheless received the requisite notice during the trial, suffi-
ciently in advance of actual use. The reason for this leniency rests
on the genuine need for latitude in such situations-where the
necessity for this hearsay evidence does not become apparent until
after the commencement of the action.,58 However, the Second
Circuit also stressed the importance of the notice requirement and
warned that the flexibility shown by the panel in this case would
only be accorded "in those situations where requiring pre-trial
notice is wholly impracticable." 59
Rule 804(b)(1) codifies the former testimony exception to the
hearsay rule. If the declarant is presently unavailable as a witness,
this Rule provides for the admissibility, even in a criminal case, of
testimony given by him as a witness at another hearing, if the ad-
verse party "bad an opportunity and similar motive to develop the
testimony by direct, cross or redirect examination." The thrust of
the "similar motive" requirement ,vas the object of inquiry by the
Second Circuit in United States c. Wingate.60 The defendants were
convicted of conspiracy to distribute heroin. After his arrest, de-
fendant Smith had made certain admissions about his and defen-
dant Wingate's participation in the narcotics activities. Before
commencement of the trail, Smith moved to suppress his state-
ment on the ground that it had not been made voluntarily. The
trial judge denied the motion at the conclusion of the suppression
hearing, and the evidence was introduced against Smith at the
joint trial. Because Smith asserted his fifth amendment right to
-5 This problem had been predicted. See Hearings on the Federal Rte of Eri.
dence Before the Senate Judicianj Comm., H.R. REP. No. 5463, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
275 passim. (June 4-5, 1974) (testimony of Paul F. Rotlstein); P. ROTIISTEIN.
UNDERSTANDING THE NEW FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, supra note 23, at 439-10.
The 1974 Uniform Rules of Evidence, which largely mirror the Federal Rules ot
Evidence, omit the requirement that notice must precede trial.
59 540 F.2d at 578 n.6.
8o 520 F.2d 309 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1074 (1976).
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remain silent at the trial, Wingate sought to introduce Smith's
suppression hearing testimony, which had repudiated Smith's ear-
lier inculpatory statement, claiming that the later testimony was
exculpatory.
In affirming the trial court's decision to exclude the suppres-
sion hearing testimony, the Second Circuit found an absence of
similarity of issues in the two proceedings-the Government was
effectively denied any meaningful opportunity to cross-examine the
declarant at the time when his former testimony was given. The
court reasoned that, while the issue at the present trial, for which
Wingate sought to introduce Smith's testimony, was the involve-
ment of Wingate in a narcotics conspiracy, the issue at the suppres-
sion hearing-i.e., the issue to which the Government confined its
cross-examination-was the voluntariness of Smith's admission, a
precondition to its use in the Government's case against Smith.
Therefore, since the prosecutor had no opportunity to cross-
examine Smith on the question of Wingate's guilt, Smith's former
testimony was inadmissible when offered by Wingate on this issue.
The court thus reaffirmed its fidelity to previous approaches which
required a certain identity of issues between the two proceedings.
But it avoided the mechanical strictness of some former decisions
which had failed to recognize the reason for the requirement and
blindly required an exact identity on all scores. 61 The court prop-
erly placed emphasis on the adequacy of opportunity and incentive
to cross-examine by the party against whom the testimony is of-
fered, rather than on a strict notion of exact identity between the
two proceedings. The new Rules put the inquiry back on the right
track by phrasing the requirement in terms of its rationale ("similar
motive") rather than in terms of identity of issues.
ARTICLE IX: AUTHENTICATION
Article IX of the Federal Rules of Evidence sets forth the
standards governing authentication and identification of evidence.
Rule 901(a) articulates the basic requirement in broad and general
terms: "The requirement of authentication and identification as a
condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sulli-
61 See Rothstein, The Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules oJ Evidence
(Updated), 24 FED'N OF INS. COUNSEL Q. 54, 79-81 (1974). One might raise the ques-
tion whether, in the case under discussion, the evidence should have been admitted
on another theory-to reduce the prejudicial effect of, or put in proper perspective,
the repudiated statement.
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cient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its
proponent claims." Rule 901(b) explains this general language by
giving illustrations, drawn from prior law, of what would satisfy this
requirement. One example is found in subsection (b)(4). Distinctive
characteristics of the document, such as its contents, can constitute
sufficient authentication, when "taken in conjunction with circum-
stances."
That this Rule codifies traditional rules of authentication is
demonstrated by United States c. Natale,62 where defendants were
convicted of conspiracy and the substantive crime of extortionate
credit transaction. At the trial, the Government introduced into
evidence a black notebook allegedly belonging to one of the defen-
dants, and seized at the time of the arrest. It contained entries
recording several credit transactions, including the ones that were
the subject of the prosecution. The defendants contended that the
notebook had not been properly authenticated since the record
failed to show that the notebook belonged to either defendant. The
court of appeals rejected this argument, and stated the general rule
that, in proving a connection between an exhibit and the defen-
dant, the prosecution need only show "a rational basis from which
the jury may conclude that the exhibit did, in fact, belong to the
appellants." 63 Furthermore, under established precedent, "while
"mere contents' are ordinarily insufficient evidence of genuineness,
contents may be considered in conjunction with other
circumstances."-64 After quoting the newly enacted Rule, the Natale
panel listed the circumstances supporting authenticity: the pres-
ence of the defendants at the location where the evidence was
discovered-which was also the place where the victim had con-
ducted meetings with the defendants concerning the transactions;
the admission by one defendant that the office was his; the fact that
the notebook was in a desk used by both defendants; and the fact
that the notebook referred to the loans the victim testified to.
Thus, the contents of the evidence, when "taken in conjunction
with circumstances," was sufficient evidence of authenticity,
whether tested by common lav requirements or by Rule 901.
Whether any one of these circumstances alone would "do the trick"
is uncertain. Rules 901(a) (quoted above) and 901(b) point in dif-
ferent directions on this point. Rule 901(a) suggests that all that is
62 526 F.2d 1160 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 42.5 U.S. 950 (1976).
6 526 F.2d at 1173.
64 Id. See United States v. Sutton, 426 F.2d 1202, 1207 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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needed is enough to justify a reasonable person in concluding
authenticity, but the examples in (b) (which make it clear, for ex-
ample, that a signature purporting to be mine is not sufficient evi-
dence that it is mine) seem to require more.
Another illustration in Rule 901(b) of evidence that supports a
finding of authenticity appears in subsection (5), which treats the
issue of voice identification. Under this provision, a witness can
identify a voice when his "opinion [is] based upon hearing the
voice at any time under circimstances connecting it with the al-
leged speaker."
A recent application of this Rule, in United States r.
Albergo,6 5 involved a defendant who had been called to testify be-
fore a grand jury concerning the Government's investigation of a
stolen airline tickets racket. He denied any knowledge of the al-
leged racket, and was subsequently prosecuted for perjury. At that
trial, the Government introduced into evidence four telephone
conversations recorded from wiretaps. The male speaker in those
conversations revealed knowledge of the airline tickets racket-
incriminating evidence if the speaker could be identified as the
defendant. After these tapes had been introduced, one Officer
Paulsen of the New York City Police Department was called as a
witness and identified the defendant as the male speaker. As a
foundation for the identification, Paulsen testified that he had lis-
tened to five-hundred taped recordings of the defendant's voice,
and had on one occasion heard the defendant speaking with a
group of other men.
The court initially relied on case authority for the general
rules of admissibility of telephone conversations: The identity of
the speaker must be satisfactorily established; and the jury must
reasonably be able to find that the alleged identification was accu-
rate. As applied to the circumstances of this case, the Albergo
panel held that the testimony of the identifying officer was quite
sufficient to support a reasonable conclusion that the officer had
accurately identified the defendant as the speaker. The defendant
urged, however, that due process was lacking in this situation,
where identification of his voice was not supported by a face-to-face
conversation between him and the identifying witness. While not
rejecting this argument in its entirety, leaving open the possibility
of applying such due process arguments in "some conceivable
65 539 F.2d 860 (2d Cir. 1976).
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circumstances,- 66 the Second Circuit did not accept it in this case,
since its application here would "make a mockery of Rule 901,"67
with its express authorization of voice identification based upon a
hearing of the voice "at any time under circumstances connecting it
with the alleged speaker."
Rule 902 enumerates a list of documents that are self-au-
thenticated, i.e., that do not require "[e]xtrinsic evidence of au-
thenticity as a condition precedent to admissibility." Such self-
authenticated documents include certified copies of public records,
as described in Rule 902(4). One recent case relying on this Rule
to sustain the admissibility of evidence is United States r. Pent-R-
Books, Inc., 68 discussed earlier. 69 This case demonstrates and re-
solves the potential conflict betveen Rule 902 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence and Rule 44(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, which seem to overlap. (No provision was made for this
when the Evidence Rules were enacted.) The defendant claimed
that the administrative records of the Postal Service, which were
offered into evidence by the Government, were not admissible
under Rule 44(a)(1) because they were not certified by a custodian
of records, but by a postal official who was not a custodian. With-
out deciding whether Rule 44(a)(1) would recognize this certifier,
the court held that Rule 902, which would be applicable on remand,
would nevertheless justify admissibility, by its expansion of the
means of authentication of official documents and their copies. Ac-
cording to Rule 902(4), copies of official records can be authorized
by certification of either the custodian "or other person authorized
to make the certification," assuming the remaining conditions of
Rule 902 are complied with. Thus, under the broader authority of
Rule 902, certain documents formerly inadmissible can now be re-
ceived into evidence. An additional contention made by the de-
fendant was that the certificate, which referred simply to "annexed
documents," failed to adequately describe the documents. Again,
the court disagreed, and refused to hold that the documents were
rendered inadmissible by this lack of specificity. However, the court
6 Id. at 864.
67 Id. On the somewhat analogous problem of a witness indentilfing the delen-
dant in bank robbery surveillance photos, see United States v. Robinson, 5-14 F.2d
110 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. - (1976) (treated as a problem involving Rule
701, lay opinion).
68 538 F.2d 519 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 1175 (1976).
69 See text accompanying notes 44-52 supra.
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did note that a listing in the certificate of the individual documents
would be better practice.
CONCLUSION
A survey of the evidence work in the Second Circuit confirms
what was expected-that the new Rules of Evidence are solving
more questions than they are raising; that they are not revolution-
ary new concepts to judges and lawyers, but carry forward long
familiar principles; that they are convenient focuses for evidence
rulings and for cataloging the law of evidence; and that, in general,
the purposes of the codifiers are being implemented, although, of'
course, not fully.70 The survey also confirms that the "Rules" are
not, by-and-large, "rules" at all, in the sense of completely self-
contained, self-executing prescriptions. Instead, they require in-
terpretation, judgment, discretion, and resort to preexisting law to
give them content. As such, they are guidelines, or standards,
only. It is to be expected that the Second Circuit will be seen as a
leader around the country, and that its interpretations will hold
sway well beyond its borders, not only in the federal system, but
also amongst the increasing numbers of states that are adopting
rules patterned after the Federal Rules of Evidence. 71
70 For a discussion of the themes and goals of the federal evidence codification
and what it may be expected to accomplish, see Rothstein, Some Themes In the
Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 33 FED. BAR J. 21 (1974).
71 The following states have adopted or are about to adopt such rules, is of the
present writing: Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Minnesota, Maine, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Vermont, and Wisconsin. It should
also be noted that, in 1974, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws revised their 1953 Uniform Rules of Evidence. The 1974 Uniform Rules,
approved by the A.B.A. and recommended to the states for adoption, are substan-
tially the same as the Federal Rules of Evidence. Even Canada has a proposed code
drawing heavily on the Federal Rules of Evidence. Law Reform Commission of'
Canada, Report, Evidence (Dec. 1975). For a comparison of that code with ours, see
Rothstein, An Evidence Code: The American Experience, 36 CiM. L. REPORTS [OF
CANADA] 274 (March 1977).
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